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The paper provides evidence for the existence of a midterm election effect on the US equity market. 
By examining the quarterly total returns on the S&P 500 Index between 1954 and 2017, we show 
that, nine times out of 10, the index has been positive in the fourth quarter of a midterm election year 
and the following two quarters. This compounds to nearly 25% in those three quarters. Neither 
changes in the monetary nor the fiscal policies were able to explain the effect. Moreover, the authors 
show that the known third year of a presidential term effect is weaker than the examined midterm 
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Introduction  
A number of studies have explored the behavior of equity markets around national 
elections. The research is motivated by the idea that when politicians speak, markets 
respond. The impact of political uncertainty on capital markets attracts substantial attention 
from scholars. Bialkowski et al. (2008) investigate stock market uncertainty around 
national parliamentary and presidential elections on a sample of 27 OECD countries and 
conclude that political uncertainty results in higher stock market volatility. Likewise, 
Goodell and Vahamaa (2013) confirm this idea and show in their study that political 
uncertainty around the US presidential elections affects stock market volatility. Julio and 
Yook (2012) provide evidence that political uncertainty matters for firms. For a sample of 
48 countries, they find that political uncertainty reduces firms’ investment expenditures 
until the uncertainty is resolved. It is reasonable to accept that changes in firms’ investment 
behavior will also affect market investors’ attitudes. In another example, Li and Born 
(2006) report that stock market volatility and average returns are higher for US presidential 
elections, preceded by polling data sending ambiguous signals about the likely winner. 
Those empirical studies are followed by Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013), whose studies 
develop the first general equilibrium model in which equity prices respond to the political 
climate.  
No less important and very appealing to the investment community is the topic of the 
political business cycle and elections. The performance of the stock market during the four-
year presidential cycle has attracted the attention of several scholars. Studies by Allivine 
and O’Neill (1980), Booth and Booth (2003), Gartner and Wellershoff (1995), Huang 
(1985), and Stovall (1992) emphasize the so-called second-half effect and confirm that 
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stock market returns exhibit a four-year US presidential cycle and that returns are 
significantly higher during the last two years of presidential administrations. Further, 
Ramchander et al. (2009) find a presidential election cycle pattern in real estate investment 
trust returns (REITs). They report higher excess returns in the second half of the US 
presidential cycle.  
The studies by Beyer et al. (2008), Booth and Booth (2003), Sturm (2013), and Wong 
and McAleer (2009) scrutinize the so-called third-year effect in the US presidential cycle 
and find that the average returns of the third year are the highest among the four-year 
presidential cycle. Beyer et al. (2008) offer a detailed analysis of the effect. They examine 
quarterly returns of S&P 500 firms between 1957 and 2004 and report a strong market 
performance in the third year of the US presidential term. They do not find evidence that 
higher returns are a compensation for higher risk. However, their analysis indicates that 
fiscal and monetary policy may play a role in explaining the observed returns patterns. On 
the other hand, Sturm (2013) shows that although tax legislation may drive the presidential 
cycle, the third-year effect is independent of the government’s influence on economic 
policy. Sturm finds no strong evidence supporting the effect of fiscal and monetary policies 
on the presidential cycle in the period between 1972 and 2007. However, he states that tax 
acts were mostly passed during the first half of the president’s term (68.75%), and 
considering the one- or two-year delay in seeing the effect of tax legislation on the 
economy, the presidential cycle might be explained with the timing of the tax legislation.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the so-called midterm election effect on the US 
equity market. The effect has not been previously documented in the academic literature 
(see Wisniewski 2016 for a comprehensive literature survey), despite the fact that some 
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initial evidence has been presented in the financial press. In September 2014, the Financial 
Times published a column1 by Ken Fisher, who called the performance of the stock market 
after the midterm election an “86.4% miracle,” due to a very predictive pattern. In 
November 2014, a contributor to the Forbes website,2 Bill Greiner, described the oddity of 
post-election stock market cycles in the November–January period after midterm elections. 
In a 2010 BlackRock newsletter,3 Robert C. Doll, chief equity strategist, refers to the 
average S&P performance and its higher return in the six months and 12 months after 
midterm elections. He notes: “…regardless of what the new legislative priorities are in the 
coming year, one immediate and positive result of the elections is that the outcome has 
gone from being an ‘unknown’ to a ‘known’.”  
Our paper offers a scholarly scrutiny of the midterm election effect on the US equity 
market. First, we examine whether any pattern is present in the US stock returns after the 
midterm elections and then carefully document the magnitude of it. Second, we compare 
the post-election stock market cycles for the presidential and the midterm elections. 
Finally, we examine whether fiscal or monetary policies are solely causing the distinctive 
return pattern.  
Our paper provides ample evidence that the midterm effect is a standalone effect and 
is not fully explained by fiscal or monetary policies. The US stocks perform extremely well 
in the fourth quarter of a midterm election year and the two quarters following: on average, 
																																																								
1	The column was published in the Financial Times 6–7 September 2014, under the title: “Stand by for the 






8.89%, 8.02%, and 6.15% return per quarter, respectively. The historical average return 
hovers around 3%. Our analysis shows that the midterm election effect is stronger than the 
third year of the presidential-term effect.  
Hypotheses     
Political signals contain information about government plans and its commitment to 
implement them. Political signals are closely monitored by investors who use them to 
update their beliefs about the government’s future policy decisions. Market participants’ 
interpretation of signals leads to actions on the capital market. Thus, stock prices respond 
to political signals and their movement is stronger when political uncertainty –about future 
legislative priorities – is larger (see Pastor and Veronesi 2012, 2013). In the majority of 
cases, the post-election period brings one immediate and positive result – a clear outcome 
in terms of which party/presidential candidate has won. In other words, the post-election 
periods resolve some of the political uncertainty and reduce the market volatility. This may 
have an impact on the level of returns.  
The analysis of the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, which measures political 
uncertainty (see Baker et al. 2016 for details), shows that, on average, political uncertainty 
is higher after presidential elections. We calculated the average of the index in the three 
quarters around the midterm elections and the presidential elections. The value of the 
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index was on average 17.5% higher in the case of the 




States	 [USEPUINDXD],	 retrieved	 from	 FRED,	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 St.	 Louis;	
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USEPUINDXD,	November	5,	2017. 
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brought an increase in the average percentage; indeed, in the period between Q1 2004 and 
Q2 2017, it exceeded 45%.  
Taking into account the difference between the levels of uncertainty observed after a 
presidential and a midterm election, we expect to observe higher returns in the first quarters 
after a midterm ballot-casting.  
Data and methodology  
In	order	to	examine	the	potential	effect,	we	collect	the	data	on	the	midterm	and	
presidential	elections	and	quarterly	returns	on	the	S&P	500	Total	Return	Index	for	
the	 period	 of	 Q2	 1954–Q2	 2017.	 The	 sample	 selection	 is	 determined	 by	 the	




the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 (Fed)	 discount	 rate	was	 a	 reduction.	 The	 federal	 funds	
premium	 is	 measured	 as	 the	 federal	 funds	 rate	 less	 the	 3‐month	 T‐bill	 rate.	 The	
impact	of	government	action	on	the	economy	and	the	stock	market	is	measured	by	
the	 change	 in	 federal	 government	 spending	 and	 percentage	 change	 in	 federal	 tax	
receipts.	The	variables	describing	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	were	sourced	from	
FRED	Economic	Data,	 St.	 Louis	 Fed.	 The	 S&P	500	Total	Return	 Index	 comes	 from	
Global	 Financial	 Data.	 The	 information	 on	 the	 time	 of	 elections	 and	 results	 were	
	 6
collected	from	the	US	House	of	Representatives	website.5	
To	 evaluate	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 findings,	 we	 consider	 two	 alternative	 sub‐












Table 1: US Midterm and Presidential Elections (1954–2017) 
	
Panel A: Presidential Election 
 Total 1954–1989 1990–2017 
Democrat 7 3 4 
Republican 9 6 3 
Total 16 9 7 
 
Panel B: Midterm Election (Senate) 
 Total 1954–1989 1990–2017 
Democrat 11* 8 3* 
Republican 6* 1 5* 
Total 16 9 7 
  
Panel C: Midterm Election (House)
 Total 1954–1989 1990–2017
Democrat 11 9 2 
Republican 4 0 4 
Total 15 9 6 
 
The table summarizes the midterm and presidential elections in the period between 
1954 and 2017. * denotes a special case: In the 2006 midterm election, both parties 
won 49 seats. Therefore, both parties are considered as a party gaining power.  
 
Results 
The main result of the paper is illustrated in Figure 1. As shown, the average S&P 500 
return during the mid-election quarter and the two quarters following the midterm election 
is at least two times higher than during the non-election quarters. The comparison with 
presidential election quarters reveals that quarter returns after a midterm election are much 
higher. The figure confirms the anecdotal observation mentioned in the financial press – 
there is indeed a midterm effect and it is substantial. The average gain in the S&P 500 Total 
Return Index is 8.9% in the quarter that includes the midterm election (Quarter 4 on the 
figure), and 8.02% and 6.15%, respectively, in the two following quarters. This compounds 
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to 24.9%.  
 
Figure 1: The bar graph shows the average quarterly returns from S&P 500 Total 
Return Index. The fourth quarter of a midterm election year and the two quarters following 
offer a superior US market performance in comparison with the same quarters in the not-
midterm election years.  
Table 2 provides further evidence on the surge of the stock market during the mid-
election period. In the case of the examined three quarters in the non-midterm-election 
periods, the market is in positive territory 65–70% of the time. For the post-midterm-
election period, it is positive 91% of the time and for the presidential election, it never 
exceeds 72%. The average return is 7.68%, 2.36%, and 1.82% for the midterm, 
presidential, and non-election three-quarters period, respectively. The 5% and 95% 
percentiles are -0.02% and 21.96% for midterm elections and -13.39% and 13.41% for the 
same quarters but in non-election periods. The further argument that an investment in the 
post-mid-election periods has a very small downside risk comes from the fact that the 
average return for negative quarters is in a range between -1.13% and -2.62%. It is not near 











Quarter	4	(yr2) Quarter	1	(yr3) Quarter	2(yr3) Quarter	3	(yr3)
Midterm	election Presidential	election Non	election	quarters
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elections, market participants are rewarded with a rather modest compounded return of 
6.3% (versus 24.9%). The average return of 2.36% is just 0.5% higher than in the case of 
the non-election periods.  
The analysis of Table 2 shows that the performance of the stock market after the US 




Table 2: US Midterm and Presidential Elections Effects  
 
The table summarizes the performance of the US stock market represented by the S&P 500 Total Return Index in the period 
between 1954 and 2017; the three quarters around the presidential and the midterm elections; Q4 is an election quarter. The p-value 



















5th Pctl.  95th Pctl.  Mean  p‐value 
Panel A: 1954 ‐2017 
Midterm election Q4, Q1, and Q2  48  9.1%  90.9%  ‐2.10%  8.57%  ‐0.02%  21.96%  7.68%  0.0001 
Presidential election Q4, Q1, and Q2  48  29.2%  70.8%  ‐6.16%  5.87%  ‐11.01%  12.82%  2.36%  0.0289 
Non‐election quarters  127  34.6%  66.4%  ‐6.61%  6.29%  ‐13.39%  13.41%  1.82%  0.0109 
                   
Panel B: 1954‐1990 
Midterm election Q4, Q1, and Q2  30  6.7%  93.3%  ‐2.62%  9.44%  ‐0.02%  21.34%  8.64%  0.0001 
Presidential election Q4, Q1, and Q2  27  29.6%  70.4%  ‐3.89%  5.39%  ‐5.79%  9.52%  2.64%  0.0177 
Non‐election quarters  76  38.2%  65.4%  ‐6.86%  6.98%  ‐18.02%  14.08%  1.69%  0.0906 
                   
Panel C: 1991‐2017 
Midterm election Q4, Q1, and Q2  21  14.3%  85.7%  ‐1.13%  7.58%  ‐0.02%  15.39%  6.34%  0.0001 
Presidential election Q4, Q1, and Q2  21  28.6%  71.4%  ‐9.19%  6.48%  ‐11.85%  15.92%  2.00%  0.3323 
Non‐election quarters  55  30.9%  69.1%  ‐6.39%  5.50%  ‐13.39%  12.58%  1.82%  0.0610 
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One may argue that higher returns during the post-midterm-election period are 
compensation for the higher volatility; however, our analysis shows that annual volatility 
in the post-midterm-election periods is lower than in the non-election periods (12.7% 
versus 15.4%). The careful reader may notice that the two quarters after the midterm 
elections are exactly the two first quarters of the third year of the presidential term. Does 
this mean that the midterm effect is a by-product of the third-year effect? In order to answer 
that question, we calculate the performance of the fourth quarter in the year after midterm 
elections, which is 4.08%, and then we calculate the performance of the stock market for 
the period of four quarters, including the midterm election one, and during the third year 
of the presidential term. The performance in the extended post-midterm-election period (of 
four quarters) is 25.7% versus 20.1% achieved in the third year of a presidential term (see 
Figure 2). We conclude that the midterm effect dominates the third year of the presidential-







 Figure 2: The graph explains the difference between the so-called third year of the 
presidential term and the midterm election effect. 
 
 
In the next step of our analysis, we examine whether the observed effect is caused 
by monetary or fiscal policy. In the case of the former, we count expansive quarters as a 
Quarter	4	 Quarter	1	 Quarter	2	 Quarter	3	 Quarter	4	
Midterm	election		
It compounds	to	25.7	%	
It	compounds	to	20.1%		(the third-year effect) 
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proxy of the Fed policy stance and federal funds premium as Fed policy stringency. A 
quarter is classified as subject to an expansive (restrictive) monetary policy if the most 
recent change in the Fed discount rate was a decrease (increase). Thus, the expansive 
quarter variable is a dummy variable, where a “1” corresponds to expansive policy in a 
given quarter. The federal funds premium is defined as the difference between the federal 
funds rate and the 3-month T-bill rate.  
Past studies by Ho and Sauders (1985), Laurent (1988), Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992), and Bayer et al. (2008) use that federal funds premium as a good measure of the 
stringency of Fed monetary policy. Directional changes in the discount rate as an 
identification of broad shifts in Fed policy is pretty common (see Jensen et al. 1996, 
Conover et al. 2005, and Bayer et al. 2008, among others).  
Fiscal policies and the level of spending are measures used by the federal 
government to stimulate the economy. Studies by Fama (1990), Cocharane (1996), and 
Campbell (1999) describe the relationship between the macroeconomic climate and the 
equity market. There is a large body of literature examining the link between fiscal policy 
and macroeconomic variables (Ramsey and Shapiro 1997 and Blanchard and Perotti 1999, 
among others). In order to examine the impact of fiscal policy on the equity market, we 
consider percentage change in federal tax receipts and change in current federal 
government spending.  
  Table 3 offers a valuable glance at the fiscal and monetary policies in post-election 
periods. Panels A–D represent different time periods after US elections. The key 
comparison is that of panel A with panel B and panel C with panel D, which reveals that 
there is not much difference in the examined policies between the post-election and non-
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election periods. The t-statistics correspond to the t-test for the equal mean between the 
midterm election and non-election periods. In the case of considered fiscal and monetary 
measures, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal means. This indicates that 
those policies were not responsible for the reported post-midterm effect.  
Table 3: Fiscal and monetary policies in post-US-election periods  
	






         
Change in Tax Receipts  1.56% 1.71% 4.02%  ‐4.10%  6.21%
Change in Current Spending  0.49% 0.37% 1.04%  ‐1.14%  2.28%
Expansive  0.44% 0 0.50%  0  1
Federal Funds Premium  0.47% 0.23% 0.82%  ‐0.21%  2%
Panel B. Post Midterm election quarters
(Q4, Q1 and Q2)  48 
         
Change in Tax Receipts  1.56% 1.08% 4.04%  ‐2.41%  5.76% ‐0.01
Change in Current Spending  0.31% 0.41% 1.06%  ‐1.35%  1.73% 1.04
Expansive  0.52% 1 0.50%  0  1 ‐1.02
Federal Funds Premium  0.35% 0.22% 0.57%  ‐0.3%  1.11% 1.20
Panel C. Non‐presidential election quarters
(Q4, Q1 and Q2)  204 
         
Change in Tax Receipts  1.53% 1.52% 3.90%  ‐3.56%  5.97%
Change in Current Spending  0.44% 0.41% 1.07%  ‐1.27%  2.24%
Expansive  0.45% 0 0.49%  0  1
Federal Funds Premium  0.46% 0.23% 0.78%  ‐0.21%  2%
Panel D. Post Presidential election quarters
(Q4, Q1 and Q2)  47 
         
Change in Tax Receipts  1.67% 2.12% 4.54%  ‐6.50%  6.21% ‐0.20
Change in Current Spending  0.53% 0.25% 0.93%  ‐0.97%  2.17% ‐0.57
Expansive  47% 0 50%  0  1 ‐0.21
Federal Funds Premium  0.37% 0.17 0.74%  ‐0.27%  1.3% 0.67
 
The table presents the summary statistics of the fiscal and monetary policy proxies 
in the post-election periods. The comparison of panel A with panel B and panel C with 
panel D allows drawing the conclusion that there is no statistical difference between those 
proxies (see the last column of the table, where the t-statistics for the test of equal mean is 
reported).  
 
In order to better evaluate the contribution of fiscal and monetary policies to the 
midterm election effect, we also examine two separate regressions. In both cases, the 
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dependent variable in the first regression is quarterly return, and the independent variable 
is the dummy variable for the three quarters around the presidential or midterm elections 
(see Table 4). The dummy variable takes the value of “1” on the midterm (presidential) 
election quarter and the two quarters following. The three-quarters election dummy is 
significant (at the 1% level) only for midterm elections.  
The objective of the second regression is to determine how much of the midterm 
election (and potential presidential election effect) is explained by the change of proxies 
for monetary and fiscal policies. In order to determine this, we perform a two-step 
regression. The first step is designed to remove the influence of the monetary and fiscal 
policy measures on the quarterly stock returns. The second step is designed to quantify the 
importance of the midterm election effect. The residuals from the first regression are 
included in the second (reported) regression as the dependent variable, and the independent 
variable is the three-quarters dummy variable. The analysis of the results reported in Table 
4 shows that the monetary and fiscal policies account for a marginal amount of the midterm 
effect. After controlling for both key policies, the three-quarters midterm election dummy 
coefficient has changed marginally (from 0.0315 to 0.0304). Moreover, the results reported 
for the post-presidential-election period, also in the case of a two-level regression, indicates 













Index  Intercept  3 ‐quarters  Intercept  3‐quarters 
 
Presidential Election 
0.0134  ‐0.0049  0.0010  ‐0.0054 
  (0.0001) (0.5168) (0.7052) (0.4599)
Midterm Election  0.0064 0.0315 ‐0.0058 0.0304
  (0.0236)  (0.0002)*** (0.0395)    (0.0002)***
   
	
The table presents regressions for the period between Q3 1954 and Q2 2017. The 
regressions are designed to test the post-election effect in the case of presidential and 
midterm voting. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to two-step regressions. ***denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level.  
Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence for the midterm election effect. We show that returns 
from the S&P 500 Total Return Index were positive in the fourth quarter of midterm 
election years and the two quarters following – in nine out of 10 times. On average, the 
returns in those three quarters compounds to a whopping 24.9%. This is clearly an 
unintentional gift from US politicians to the market at the time when their trustworthiness 
is assessed by voters. The examined effect is not driven by changes in fiscal and monetary 
policies and is not compensation for higher volatility. The variability of returns in the post-
midterm-election times is actually lower than in analogous periods.  
The post-election surge is present after the midterm elections and absent after the 
presidential elections. The potential cause of the midterm election effect is a reduction of 
political uncertainty in the past ballot-casting periods. In the case of presidential elections, 
the uncertainty remains at an elevated level even after the selection of the commander-in-
chief (head of state).  
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